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Pascal De Decker & Caroline Newton 
Introduction – words, just words 
PROBLEMS: residualisation, marginalisation, ghettoization, concentrated 
poverty, asocial behaviour, social ghetto’s, poverty ghettos, poverty 
neighbourhoods, warehouses, barracks… 
SOLUTION: social mix. 
STRATEGIES: sale, demolition, changing legislation & regulation. 
This selection of ‘words’ or ‘ideas’ are frequently appearing in popular texts as well as 
in housing policy papers and academic literature. Terms like ‘ghetto’, ‘asocial 
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behaviour’, ‘social mix’ etc. are ideas that impact the policy-making process. 
According to Stoeger (2013), analysing the impact of the term ‘social exclusion’ in 
Austria, the impact can be understood in at least three ways.  
First, ideas can serve as ‘cognitive maps’ that guide the design of policies over longer 
period of time. It is like a ‘policy paradigm’. According to Stoeger this can be defined 
as a cognitive (and normative) framework which, besides specifying the types of 
policy measures and instruments, fundamentally shapes the perception of a problem 
that has to be solved – e.g. concentrated poverty in social housing - and the objectives 
of public policy making. 
Second, ideas can be understood as a ‘blueprint’ that provide policy-makers with a 
concise model for policy reform. Following Béland (2007), Stoeger argues that ideas 
can offer a coherent understanding of actors’ interests, institutional opportunities (and 
constraints) and the economic pressures, where through they help actors to coordinate 
their efforts and build coalitions.  
Thirdly, ideas can be effectively used as ‘tools’ or ‘weapons’ in (political) struggles. 
According to Schmidt (2010) ideas (words) can be understood as political discourses 
that help actors to convince other actors, the public or the media that a particular (and 
perhaps) unpopular reform option is urgently required. This implies, still according to 
Stoeger, that actors have the ability of using discourse (or ‘storylines’) strategically to 
impose their particular perception on others. This perception can be based on sound 
empirical evidence, but sometimes this is not, since, as Sahlin (1996), argues with 
respect to social housing that ‘the public definition of housing problems is partly 
independent of what residents think’. 
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In this chapter we unravel how (popular) discourses have influenced the policies and 
legislation on social housing and what the underlying historical and contextual factors 
were that have influenced the formation of such a strong discourse that was able to 
influence policy. Until the early 1990s, complaints on the role and functioning of 
social rental housing in Flanders had the following features. In general they were 
nothing more than a relative unproblematic narrative in the margins, which was 
absorbed into everyday life practices. The problematisation of the sector came about 
during the 1990s and was influenced by the large influx of poor people and migrants 
into social houses. Thus, what was a low-scale debate or a sudden upsurge at a higher 
scale became a highly politicised discourse leading to controversial legislation and 
regulations, which worried international organisations. E.g. the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (7/3/2008) rose in its report on Belgium critical 
concerns with regards to the adapted Flemish housing legislation, the ‘Flemish 
Housing Code’ (15/12/2006). More specifically the language requirement (aspirant 
social housing tenants have to speak, or commit to learn, Dutch) was questioned and 
the Committee urged the Belgian State to ‘ensure that linguistic requirements do not 
lead to indirect discrimination affecting both citizens and non-citizens who do not 
speak Dutch, on grounds of their national or ethnic origin, thus impairing their 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, in particular their housing rights’ 
(UN-CERD 2008:4).  
Also Thomas Hammerberg (2009) in his report to the Council of Europe showed 
concern, fearing that ‘the obligatory language requirements for accessing municipal 
services may stigmatise persons whose mother tongue is not Dutch and jeopardise 
efforts to foster tolerant communities with respect to diversity’.  
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The fear for possible racial discrimination wasn’t only formulated on the international 
level; already during the preparations of the 2006 decree a lot of protest was heard. 
Voices of concern resonated in the media from institutions involved in human rights 
protection (in the broadest sense) to academics (Blommaert, 2005; De Witte, 2005;  
Delruelle & Torfs, 2005; Liga voor de rechten van de mens, 2005; RISO Antwerpen, 
Team Hoogbouw, 2005; Vlaamse Huurdersbonden, 2005; VOB, 2006; Animotto, 
2008). 
The ‘language element’ wasn’t the only concern. The introduction of a probation 
clause, which granted the social housing institutions the possibility to terminate a 
contract with those tenants who do not fulfil their obligations or are troublesome 
within or after a 2 year period, was also contested since it makes the social housing 
company party and judge at the same time. 
Both elements, the language clause and the probation period, and precisely the 
fundamental critique on them made the Constitutional Court rule that the decree had to 
be modified on the mentioned issues. Consequently the Flemish Government rephrased 
parts of the decree, altering the ‘probation period’ to a ‘training opportunity’ and the 
insufficient knowledge of Dutch could no longer result in being evicted or rejected as 
tenant but could still be penalised.   
Despite the rulings of the court, over the course of the next years the underlying 
presuppositions were enforced in other pieces of legislation of which the ‘Social Rental 
decision’ of October 12, 2007 (and the changes since then) is exemplar. Again, the 
Flemish government rephrased in a positive tone the rules they intended to imply: the 
language requirement was being described as an opportunity to empower the tenants, 
as it would enhance communication and engagement with the institutions. Additionally 
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it was stressed that it would enhance the safety and liveability of the complexes, 
because for example in emergencies people could communicate efficiently (Vlaamse 
Overheid 2008:7). Furthermore it was argued that in order to increase the ‘liveability’ 
of social rental estates ‘exceptional measures’ were justified, such as the refusal to 
allocate a dwelling if that would influence the liveability of the estate. The 
discretionary power to make this sort of interpretations was pushed to the local 
government, e.g. in Antwerp the local regulation introduced a threshold on the number 
of allocations to homeless persons (Meeus & De Decker, 2013). Another strategy to 
counter the further residualisation of the social housing sector is the promotion of 
social mix through the increase of the level of maximum income of the beneficiaries. 
In this way the governments hope to attract more middle income families in the sector. 
Some of these arguments, as well as the implicit meanings behind them, are also 
present in the Decree on Land and Building Policy, voted on 27th of March 2009. This 
Decree is as controversial as the aforementioned change and execution of the Housing 
Code. Two elements are important. A first one is the ‘re-formulation’ of the Housing 
code’s social mix goal. The construction of new social housing in municipalities that 
already have a share of 9 per cent of more is suspended in order to avoid a further 
concentration. Secondly, in order to avoid that large numbers of poor(urban) 
inhabitants move to the new (non-urban) social rental estates, the government gives 
priority to households with local ties, a measure that in the meantime is also introduced 
in the social rental legislation). This 'Living in Your Own Region' has in the meantime 
been quashed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Judgment of 8 May 2013 
in Joined Cases C-197/11 & C-203/11 Libert and Others). Soon after the approval of 
the decree on Land and Building, a big public controversy unfolded: important 
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stakeholders, the private developers to be more precise, were extremely hostile as the 
decree obliged that developments of a large number of dwellings had to preserve 20 
per cent  of the units for social housing1. Numerous politicians backed up the building 
federation’s protest of the decree. And during a debate on the national radio the 
Flemish minister of housing emphasized that he understood the concerns of the 
developers, referring to social tenants as ‘the Flodder family’. This pejorative notion to 
refer to social tenants comes from a Dutch movie, released in 1986. It tells the story of 
an anti-social marginal family that is relocated from their deprived neighbourhood to a 
luxurious villa in a posh neighbourhood. The use of this movie, which seriously 
exaggerates all possible clichés of social tenants and the reaction of the elite 
neighbours, is therefore a painful reflection against the new decree.  
The above illustrates how, explaining the 20 per cent  reserved for social housing from 
a concern for the poor, the Flemish government uses a public discourse, a ‘sermon’ 
(Bemelmans-Videc et al, 2003) in such a way that it looks very social while the 
controversy that arises indicates that there is more to it than meets the eye. The aim of 
this chapter is to unravel the hidden reasons that fostered the discourse, and 
additionally to deal with their consequences, being a decrease of affordable social 
rental housing in the cities (if the mentioned laws are executed within the letter of the 
law). In what follows, we will explain how discourses on social housing were used by 
different actors to achieve specific goals. An how, after a period when housing was 
high on the political agenda, the main discussions on social rental housing shifted to 
local settings and almost disappeared from the national plan. How they suddenly 
reappeared on the Flemish regional scale at the beginning of the nineties and affected 
the legislation, because of the popularity of the apparent coherence of the discourse 
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and its rising popularity among influential people (see e.g. Schmidt 2002). 
We first dismantle and analyse the discourse on social rental housing for which we 
build on both Deleuzian ideas and concepts and Foucault’s approaches of discourse 
analysis. This knowledge can help to elucidate, in a third part of the paper, how the 
discourse on social housing became a highly politicised story. Both the theoretical 
frame and the analysis will be paralleled by and interwoven with the chronicle of social 
rental housing in Flanders/Belgium in an intermediary. All of this will finally enable us 
to draw some concluding remarks and to unveil the power of the social rental housing 
discourse in Flanders.  
Theoretical Frame  
Discourse analysis emerged during the late 1960s as a practice, which was influenced 
by several disciplines (Van Dijk 1988:17). Since then, discourse analysis has become 
commonly used in many social science domains. Because of its broad application, 
numerous definitions of discourse analysis can be found. We start on the basis of 
Hajer’s (1995; 2008) conceptualisation. For him discourse is ‘an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categorizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical 
phenomena, and which is produced and reproduces in an identifiable set of practices’ 
(Hajer and Uitermark 2008:3). A discursive event has, according to Fairclough (1992) 
three dimensions: discourse as a piece of text, discourse as discursive practice and 
discourse as social practice. Fairclough’s and Hajer’s approaches to discourse analysis, 
which integrate both discursive and social practices (Macleod 2002) lead us on to 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of discursive practices. 
In ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ (1972) Foucault shows that ‘‘discourses’, in the 
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form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere 
intersection of things and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, 
coloured chain of words’. He argues that the task we should set for ourselves ‘consists 
of not - of no longer treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements 
referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak’. Thus, through the use of language, meaning is attached 
to social phenomena, but these phenomena are not merely being described, since 
through the discourse, significant meanings are attached to them. Because of this, 
discourse also reproduces the social phenomena it is ‘talking about’ or paves the way 
for changes. Precisely this element will be significant when discussing the position of 
the social tenants.  
When we are cautious about the discourses present in a society, we are able to 
understand the relationships between the actors and the regimes of truth that are 
produced. Every society has its own regimes of truth: norms, values and discourses 
that are considered to be the legitimate ones, and which organise and normalise 
society. These are articulated by those who are regarded as being authorised to do so. 
Thus, discourse is able to (re)produce power relationships. Deleuze (2004 (1988):154-
55) also stresses that language and the way it is used is much more than some sort of 
coding used to communicate, it is ‘…a political affair before it is an affair for 
linguistics;…’. Since often, as Blommaert (2007) writes, language and the messages 
they contain, include a series of evaluations (e.g. the Flodders are bad neighbours). 
And when articulated in the public sphere bypeople with authority like members of 
parliament, (former) ministers, mayors or university professors, they contain an appeal 
to essential truthfulness (Blommaert 2007:52).  
 9 
Additionally Deleuze (2004 (1988):229-55) brings to our attention that ‘macro- 
societal’ ideas, concepts, norms, etc. are not only present on the macro-level level, but 
also on the lower everyday life level. And it is precisely because they interact that 
power and control can be exercised. Or in Deleuze’s words: ‘…but every politics is 
simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004 
(1988):235). In this paper we try to understand where and how these relations between 
both levels have been established.  
Deleuze (1980) stresses that a discourse should not be analysed through deconstructing 
merely the linguistic propositions, but that it needs to be placed within its contexts. 
What follows is grounded in the knowledge that by working from a rigidly framed 
definition of discourse analysis will not be useful. Instead discourse analysis is 
approached as a way to understand why people are talking (or acting) about certain 
matters in a specific way. What is their motivation for doing so, are there hidden 
assumptions that influence their thinking, which are then reflected in their speech? 
Discourse analysis is used to investigate if dominant norms and values are dispersed 
within the actions, and within the habitus of certain groups, even if these norms are in 
fact oppressing them.  
We partly follow Macleod (2002:21) who emphasis that a discourse is more than mere 
text; it is also the gestures that accompany it, or it can be the act that is a consequence 
of it (consider the actual increase of income levels for social tenants, which is the 
translation of the societal discourse that tries to sell to people that ‘mix is the max’, 
(De Decker 2005). Accordingly, we strongly adhere to Foucault’s notion that a 
discourse is ‘a practice that systematically forms the object of which it speaks’. 
Additionally Foucault points to the unspoken: ‘The manifest discourse, therefore, is 
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really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say...’ (Foucault 1977). 
Accordingly, it is also important to analyse these hidden messages, which might 
actually tell us more than the spoken word.  
Finally Schmidt (2010) brings to our attention that paying attention to the interactive 
process of discourse, thus trying to understand who said what to whom and where, is 
an important factor to help to get an insight in the dynamic processes of institutional 
change. I can help us to see where ‘discursive coalitions’ are formed and how these 
coalitions can push legislation and policy. These ideas and thoughts that are brought 
together in the discursive practice do not appear from nothing, they are grounded in the 
society and the social changes and crisis’s it is confronted with. In what follows we 
will give a brief sketch of the context in which the anti-social discourse, that pushed 
the abovementioned pieces of legislation, was able to emerge.  
 Social rental housing in context 
In Flanders, only a very small share of the housing stock can be considered as social 
rental housing. This follows from a longstanding and stable policy option to solve 
housing problems by stimulating the homeownership of a single family dwelling 
preferably outside the (industrial) cities (De Decker, 2011). As a consequence a large 
majority of Flemish households own their dwelling. Conversely, only a small 6 per 
cent of Flemish households rent a dwelling provided by a social housing company, 
while the Western European (EU15) average fluctuates around 11 per cent  (figures for 
2001-2002). Neighbouring countries such as France (18 per cent ), Germany (15 per 
cent ) and The Netherlands (38 per cent ) have percentages considerably in excess of 
the average (Edgar et al, 2002).  
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Important here is the historical continuity of the housing policy choices (De Decker et 
al, 2009). The policy started with the 1889 Housing Law. This law, born out of fear for 
the consequences of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation has industrialising urban 
areas from the start (1880-1920) put in place ‘not only most of the institutional 
components of this policy developed, but also most of the perceptions commonly 
associated with it’ (Mougenot 1988:532). From the beginning a negative discourse 
emerged around social rental housing. Mougenot (1988:546) explains that social 
tenants and collective housing solutions were already a century ago regarded as 
inferior and consequently ‘limited rights were associated with the social and moral 
unworthiness of the inhabitants’. The first social housing agencies were established 
shortly after 1900, and although generally represented as being successful, little effect 
was observed on the field and inhabitants had difficulties identifying themselves with 
‘these mass-produced small homes which the local building societies are now able to 
build’ (Mougenot 1988:545). In the public discourse tenants were perceived as truly 
destitute, and should be thankful for the possibilities created by the new policy. 
Consequently ‘the political power was, at the same time, confirming in a naturally 
obvious manner their inability to belong to the category of real-estate owners. 
Proletarians, without any social recognition, have only duties towards the housing 
societies (even today these duties can be described as feudal); the inhabitants of these 
houses cannot be differentiated or identified in any way. This negative attribute, this 
inability to be anyone else other someone ‘receiving aid’, is materially visible in the 
very existence of the social housing estates with compare negatively with the vast 
variety of individual housing’ (Mougenot 1988:545). 
So, with roots in the development of the 1889 law, by the end of the First World War, 
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the Belgian ‘housing model’ (Mougenot’s words) is established around the following 
features: 
· a private rental sector with hardly any state intervention and landlords who can 
independently set their rents and easily terminate contracts, consequently 
creating an unattractive sector; 
· a small and visible and thus ‘stigmatisable’ social rental sector, and in the long 
run an unattractive sector; 
· wide support for homeownership based on (1) household initiative (self-
promotion and self-construction), (2) single family housing, (3) with a garden 
and (4) located outside the cities. 
Being unpopular from the start, social renting would remain marginal. All successful 
later housing laws would promote and stimulate homeownership, using a wide range of 
techniques (grants, cheap loans, social purchase dwellings; social plots of land, tax 
exemptions…), creating an obsession of the federal and regional governments with 
homeownership and individualised provision. 
The ever limited budget that was allocated to the social rental housing sector and the 
very narrow sighted and unimaginative vision on the subject made that, very soon, 
boring (high-rise) estates were constructed and equally uninspiring small scale social 
neighbourhoods in the suburban zones. Consequently architecturally homogeneous 
small extensions of existing village cores were developed all over Flanders/Belgium. 
Around these, the typical Flemish sprawl spread further (De Decker, 2011). In almost 
every corner of the region, cities, towns and villages have their Chicago building(s) 
(Antwerp, Genk), their Dallas estate (Lokeren), their Formosa (Wetteren) or Korea 
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(Ieper); or - as in Aalst - their ‘sex blocks' (figure 1), where the people who did not 
have the resources to build or buy their own dwelling were housed and where the local 
neighbourhood residents had funny stories about, but which were not regarded as 
problematic. It is only around 1990 that we see the tone of the discourse change. 
The residual position of social rental housing within housing policy did not really 
changed the last few decades. But this structural marginal share of social rental 
housing was generally not perceived as social or policy problem as long as 
homeownership rates rose fast enough and the construction of new private dwellings 
was defined as successful. But this changes when the economic crisis of the late 1970s, 
early 1980s hits society. Unemployment skyrocketed as did poverty, and the first wave 
of Asylum seekers enter the country. This had major consequences for the housing 
market in general – although the existence of a housing crisis was never officially 
accepted (De Decker, 2002) - and management of social rental housing in particular. A 
first consequence is the strong increase of the pressure on the waiting lists.  Although 
this is not documented at that time the impression pumped up – and stayed until today - 
that the waiting list become longer and that less people could enter a social rental 
dwelling, what in turn augmented the pressure on the even problematic private sector 
(De Decker, 2001).  The second consequence follows from the first and considers an 
ongoing lamenting as well in the public as the political sphere about the shortage of 
social rental dwellings, including ‘incomprehension’ with respect to the small market 
share of social rental housing given the ‘huge’ amounts of money put in it.  So at 
different occasions in parliament, the minister and the social housing companies were 
reprimanded for the weak delivery. 
A third consequence of the crisis was a dramatic and structural change of the 
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composition of the population. This can be caught with two words: impoverishment 
and colorization, as increasingly poor people and immigrants entered social housing. 
For the social housing companies this  implied not only a decrease of rental incomes 
and thus a thread for the financial liveability of the sector, but also the entrance of poor 
immigrants with social problems (e.g. unemployed) and people with personal problems 
(e.g. ex-psychiatric patients, Verstraete et al, 2013) what led to the perception of rising 
liveability problems following lifestyle conflicts (Cools, 2003, 2004).The importance 
of this change of the composition of the population for the discourse to come cannot be 
underestimated. For the social housing companies, it was very clear: the 
underinvestment in social housing and especially the increase of poor and alien tenants 
made it more difficult to manage the housing stock.  
Taken together, the fertile ground for discourses that start blaming the disadvantaged 
populations for the ‘assumed’ failure of social housing as it stood at the dawn of the 
1990s can be summarized as follows: On the one hand an image of a badly performing 
sector came to the public, while on the other hand more and more poor and alien 
people came into the social housing sector erasing its the financial stability. These 
‘structuring’ contextual features wherein social housing companies had to work would 
remain feeding and even reinforcing the discourse in the years to come since the 
tenants became even poorer, the share of aliens higher and the waiting list longer. 
Above that the financing of the social housing system would remain inefficient and as 
time passed by also quality issue in general and more specifically that of high-rise 
estates would become a new problem. This all left the head players in the social rental 
housing field, be it the managers, the tenants and the boards, very frustrated and 
feeling inferior. And as a consequence a seemingly rational, seemingly factual and 
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justified demand for investment and commitment changed to become demagogic and a 
not documented discourse that would finally lead to changes in legislation and 
regulation, and the demolition of a first estate (Rabot towers in Ghent, see figure 2).  
The up scaling of the local skirmishes 
The range of local discourses on social housing hardly extended the local 
neighbourhood setting and the immediate environment but since the estates and the 
related local gossip were spread out over the country, almost everyone could easily 
quote a story or two about some deviant social renters in their hometown. In the early 
nineties, local discourses - fostered by strategic gatekeepers like mayors and members 
of parliament, combining parliamentary work with local activities (e.g. being in the 
board of a local housing company) - started to reach the national media.  
From inclusive to exclusionary 
At the end of the 1980s the discourse on social rental housing started to jump scales 
and since then underwent major changes. At first the discourse promoted inclusion, 
later the discourses became exclusionary.  
The discourse changed from promoting (larger shares of) social rental dwellings for 
poor and/or foreign people to advocating lowering intake of certain categories of 
people. The 'labelling' of certain categories changed during the time, depending on (a) 
who was the minister and (b) who spoke out. With the risk to simplify, speakers from 
left wing political parties or organisation used a more euphemistic phrasing than right 
wing parties, who were more direct in blaming the ‘offenders’ (the poor and vulnerable 
tenants). But both sides very quickly agreed on the causes and solutions. These 
contemplations and the fear to get convicted for racism and discrimination stimulated 
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the use of other 'concepts' and 'words' to describe the problems. 'Migrants', 'low income 
people', 'poor people', 'anti-social people', 'social frauds', 'addicts' became largely 
interchangeable terms, depending on who was speaking and to whom one was 
speaking.  
What people say at home, or at the bar in a pub, or discuss within an organisation, even 
a local social housing association, is not a discourse. In order to be successful - this is 
e.g. provoking a change in legislation or the rejection to build new estates - it has to be 
systematic and coherent, it should be pronounced by people appealing to essential 
truthfulness, link local with central level and reach the public through mass media. It 
should be, as Blommaert & Verschueren (1998) argue, ‘quotable’. Or as we have 
elaborated earlier using argumentations of Foucault, Deleuze and Blommaert, it – 
politics - happen on both a macro and micro level of society and discourses (re)create 
power relations.  
Here we cannot fully elaborate on every quote of a politician or journal article. We 
want to stress that although a multitude of actors (politicians, academics…) and 
institutions (media, NGO’s, human right organisations,...) all had and still have their 
say in the debate, it are people active in the social housing sector that have the actual 
steering capacity. Presidents and managers of social housing companies and their 
umbrella organisation VVH2 often have a very direct impact on the agency’s policies. 
This is significant as it is often politicians who hold a chair in the board of these 
agencies. As we will conclude further, they eventually jeopardised their own 
organisations. This also illustrates, following Deleuze’s argument, how the link 
between, or jump from the everyday practice to the national scale is made. People who 
cumulate jobs and functions at different levels are in a prime position to take certain 
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narratives to a higher level. Let us look at e.g. C. Decaluwé, when writing governor of 
the province of Western Flanders. Before he became Flemish Member of Parliament 
for the CD&V (Christian Democratic party) he was working at the research unit of the 
Christian labour union ACW from 1987 to 1995. Besides numerous other functions, he 
held board positions in the following housing associations: ‘Domus Flandria’ 3 (1991-
1995), ‘Elk zijn huis’4 (1993-current) and even in the umbrella organisation VHM 
(1989-1999) and the VLM5. Thus, Decaluwé isn’t only politician on two scales (he 
was also a member of the municipality council of Kortrijk), he is also a ‘social 
landlord’ on two scales and part of the top of the biggest social movement in Flanders. 
Like Decaluwé, many others can be named 6. 
The second point we want to make is about the important role played by the media, 
which are full of ‘illustrations’ (see e.g. figure 3), sound bites, quotes from prominent 
persons and reportages following incidents 7. Let us consider the infamous ‘jar of 
chocolate paste’ incident. The high-rise estate on the left bank of the Schelde in 
Antwerp was already suffering from a bad reputation for a while. On 17 March 1997 
the local newspaper reported an incident about a glass jar that was thrown from a high 
floor of the ‘Chicago building’8. The article titled ‘Are our children inferior?’ and the 
tone of the article went from a general feeling of unsafety amongst the inhabitants 
because of objects that are thrown (even a shopping hamper was mentioned) to a 
feeling of unsafety because of youngsters who are hanging around... ‘not often with 
good intentions’9. The next day an article in the same newspaper titled ‘Life in the 
Chicago block is like hell’. In this account the mother of the girl on who the jar fell 
spoke out: ‘It is not a migrant’s problem. The majority behaves, it is those ten out of 
200 families that don’t show good manners and throw their stuff around, because they 
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are too lazy to walk to the garbage bin’.  
One day later the same newspaper could already publish a reaction of Leo Peeters, then 
the housing minister. Although he was not a supporter of levering up the minimum 
income (as an eligibility criteria), he did state that a social mix might be a future 
solution for ‘problematic social housing estates’ (in the broadest sense), while in the 
meantime he emphasised that priority should be given to interventions that enhance the 
liveability of these neighbourhoods.  
When analysing this course of events several elements deserves attention. First of all 
we see that a local incident, caught by local media was able to ignite and upsurge 
‘common people’s stories’ and reshape them into highly public discourses with effect 
on a political scale. A second, and very important observation, is the change in the tone 
of the press coverage. From a non-coloured, non-racial, but nevertheless dangerous 
incident to a racially related discourse with a more ‘aggressive’ tone, as it went from 
the throwing of an object (which could have been done by anyone) to the expression of 
concern that certain families were responsible for the problems, explicitly emphasising 
that ‘the majority is ok, but …’. 
 Let us now reflect back upon Foucault’s remark about ‘the unspoken’: an equally 
amount of information is inferable from that which is not explicitly stated (Foucault, 
1977). Additionally let us also recall the fear for penalisation when caught making 
racist remarks. It then becomes clear that the messages that filters through to the 
readers of the newspaper and the general public as a whole was that of coloured people 
making trouble in social housing estates.  
Although these sorts of statements are quite provocative and politically incorrect they 
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are in line with reality. But as stressed before it is not quite enough to have someone, 
most often a very local, middle-of-the-road, person telling scuttlebutts to speak of a 
discourse. It is only when people with authority rephrase these ideas, and when they 
can stay in society in a more lasting way that they can become a discourse and start 
influencing the things they speak about (see Foucault, Deleuze, Mcleod and 
Blommaert). It is precisely this that we will turn to now. 
One condition to make a discourse successful is that it reaches the media in a more or 
less permanent way. As said, to be picked up it has to be quotable. This means that it 
has - in an over-mediatised society - to be either provocative or pronounced by a 
person with an important/relevant function and/or reputation; or all at once. This 
certainly was the case as one of the persons that lit the fire, Bob Cools, was (and when 
writing still is) a conspicuous, provocative, literate and catchy, communicable 
personality, and at the time he entered the debate, the socialist was in his second term 
mayor of Flanders' largest city Antwerp. Earlier he was alderman of spatial planning. 
He was a member of the managerial boards of Sabena (the national airline company) 
and the NMBS (the railway company) for the socialist party. He also was a member of 
parliament and of the central bureau of his political party. Given the fact that Cools 
was/is a well-known and respected person, who also wrote a book  on the urban 
problems 10 (Cools, 1993), and  was the longstanding chairman of an Antwerp 
(socialist) social housing company (Onze Woning),made him, in combination with a 
provocative way of speaking - often seeking controversy -   a very popular person for 
the media.  
It was Cools who connected the rise of the Vlaams Blok, the extreme right party, with 
migrants in social housing. In a 1990 interview he made a plea for the concentration of 
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migrants, since, in his opinion, the dispersal of migrants, through the allocation 
processes of social rental housing led to an uncontrollable spread, dispersing 
xenophobic and racist feelings throughout the population.  
‘If I put one Moroccan in a social flat, the whole building will vote for the Vlaams 
Blok’ (De Standaard 11, 9 June 1990) 
Later he recalled that the concentration of migrants in social flats - up to 55 per cent  in 
his company - gave a lot of trouble with respect to living together. And he suggested a 
threshold (De Morgen, 29 May 1997), basically implying that he replaced his 
concentration solution by a pro mix solution, which he would advocate by pleading to 
open up social housing to middle income groups 12. In his PhD he researched the 
possibility of an allocation strategy based on lifestyles (Cools, 2004), since he claims 
to understand why people concentrate 
‘There are reasons for: social, religious, medical, ethnical, and even cooking and 
dining cultures’ (Het Nieuwsblad, 15 maart 1998). 
In 2003 Cools emphasised, in the monthly publication of the VHM, that problems of 
cohabitation in social housing estates were induced by the differences in customs and 
habits of the inhabitants (Cools, 2003, p. 16), as such again implicitly pleading for 
some sort of ‘possible voluntary segregation’. 
Another booster was Achiel Smets, yearlong chairman of another Antwerp social 
housing company (De Goede Woning, of Catholic signature), former Member of 
Parliament for the Christian Democrats (left wing), and member of the Antwerp 
council. He fluttered the dovecotes under a heading in de newspaper De Morgen (28 
jan. 1990) ‘The ghettos of the Goede Woning. Objective allocation does not work. 
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Plead for the segregation of migrants’. Smets was even more fundamentalistic than 
Cools. The solution he putted forward was the concentration of migrants in ghettos at 
the edge of the large agglomerations. He only wanted to allow migrants who were 
willing to integrate and some years later, he pleaded for a far reaching discretionary 
power in order to allocate social dwellings. 
Different lifestyles can create frictions in the everyday, at local level. A provocative 
formulation of these events, incidents or animosity by local and national media can put 
the events in the spotlight. These sorts of occurrences can be read in a political way, as 
such being picked up by politicians and put on the national agenda, thus jumping 
scales.  We have also shown that very quickly the discourses get ‘coloured’ and 
alternating associations are made with poverty, a-social behaviour, fraud, etc.  
Fact is that, when the millennium turn was in sight, there was a broad consensus 
among most democratic parties on policies promoting social mix, which in fact should 
be read as an attempt to limit the in stream of a different category of people labelled as 
‘problematic’. Take e.g. the Christian Democrats. In the preparation of the elections of 
1999, their Chairman, Marc Van Peel, MP, phrased the issue of social mix under the 
heading ‘Security, tolerance and justice’ 13. The text defines so-called ‘end terms for 
tolerant living together’. Statement 2 says: ‘The presence of ethnic minorities is a 
richness, not a thread. Nevertheless we should, by 2002, have realised the ‘social mix’ 
in the urban quarters. The concentration of vulnerable people, migrants and other 
social weaker persons should not be higher than 20 per cent.  A too high concentration 
of migrants and other socially weaker persons can be a major source of intolerance. 
Therefore, we should have a policy of spread and mix.  (…) New construction of ‘large 
blocks’ should be decreased and replaced by a policy of small scaled projects.‘ 
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Also some Antwerp Social Democrats joined the discourse. In a report, the journal 
Gazet van Antwerpen 14, referred to Robert Voorhamme and Patrick Janssens, who 
were respectively the local Antwerp Chairman (and MP) and the nation chairman of 
the Socialist Party, both members were on the board of social housing companies 15. 
Concerning the income levels, it was stated that: ‘The thresholds should go up. Every 
social housing company in Antwerp, with far the greatest number of social rental 
dwellings in the country, is now confronted with financial losses. In order to give them 
more breathing space, the thresholds should go up.  (…) If the minister doesn’t change 
them, then he de facto causes the tearing down of the large social housing complexes. 
A building like the ‘Chicago block’ is destroyed by the income eligibility rules, since 
you do not have a mix of social classes’.  
Already earlier, in 1997, in a policy proposal note 16, two members of the board of an 
Antwerp social housing company, therein appointed by the Green Party, called for ‘a 
well-considered appointment by a screening of candidates in order to know his/her 
wishes and to avoid disturbance of existing equilibriums.’ They also made a plea for a 
selective increase of the eligibility income in problematic estates, the integrated 
dispersion of migrants, the allocation of not integrated migrants into heterogeneous 
estates with different live styles but with social and technical accompaniment 17, a child 
density index for complexes around an inner square, no new social housing near 
existing complexes, the obligation of social accompaniment for problem tenants, who 
– at best – should not be located in high density complexes around an inner square. 
Current discussions 
Gradually the described debate cooled down. Basically because the social housing 
 23 
sector pulled back, since eventually their worries were taken more and more serious by 
the successive ministers and governments. The vague concept of social mix and the 
consensus on the need to attract more middle income groups to social rental  (what 
implicitly implies less poor – read: migrant – people) functions, next to the attempts of 
the government(s) to change the legislation in line with the complaints, as lubricating 
oil. And as currently incidents are as good as absent, more breathing space is created, 
as the mass media have no tit-bit, what is not surprisingly, since (largely ignored) 
research in de meantime shows no general malaise in social rental housing. On the 
contrary, the satisfaction of people living there is high (Pannecoucke et al, 2001; Stoop 
& Albertijn, 2003; Heylen et al, 2007).  
In retrospect, the exclusionary discourse escalated after the new social legislation in 
1994 imposing more restrict allocation rules. The discourses ‘in the end’ fostered   a 
difficult search since new regulations – which in their consequence undoubtedly 
exclude people – had to compromise with (international) legislation concerning 
discrimination, xenophobia and racism. That this has been a delicate exercise was 
shown in the introduction, and resulted in a number of new rules. The new 1999 
allocation regulation was withdrawn in 2000 and replaced by a new one; in 2006 the 
1997 Housing Law was changed in order create a frame for new allocation rules, 
which were introduced in 2007, but changed already twice and the  government that 
took office in 2008 announced an evaluation and adaption (Vlaamse regering, 2009) of 
the existing rules.  
Taking things together the following three elements are of importance: (a) regarding 
the allocation criteria, the income levels have been (and will be) raised to allow middle 
class families to enter; (b) local governments are granted more autonomy with regard 
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to allocation criteria and the management of the estates, and (c) permission is granted 
to screen candidates before a dwelling is allocated to them. 
The delicateness of the equilibrium was already illustrated by the hostile reactions to 
the Land and Building Decree of 2009. Intentionally this decree wanted to answer two 
issues. The first concerns a very general complaint about rising housing and housing 
land prices 18; the second concerns the wish to disperse social rental housing outside the 
larger cities. This latter is a request from the cities who argue that the concentration of 
the necessary social rental housing channels low income households to the cities, as 
such affecting their fiscal base.   
The resistance against this decree – which is a resistance against the obligation to 
foresee social rental housing and not against freeing building land – can be evaluated 
as collateral damage of the discourse. As shown, social rental housing was never a 
popular item and the social rental is the sector of the non-deserving. Developers argue 
that introducing social (rental) housing will have an impact on the saleability of the 
dwellings; and – to be honest – are the municipalities to blame when they refuse to 
house people who affect – so they think - their financial base negatively and are 
troublesome? So, currently, local debates on the spatial planning of new social 
dwellings are often overshadowed by the importance of this discourse that emphasises 
the ‘pathologies’ of the social renters.  
To Conclude 
When,  concepts such as ‘social mix’ and ‘anti-ghetto’ are  - from the early 1990s 
onwards -  included in the motivation for  legislation, consequently creating laws and 
regulations that in practice exclude certain population groups, we need to critically ask 
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what made this possible.  
In the previous sections we have provided a broad insight of how this mechanism 
could work. To conclude we want to focus on two elements. First of all we can agree 
with the contemplation of Foucault and Deleuze when they argue that ‘discourse (…) 
systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1972) and that 
language is ‘a political affair before it is an affair for linguistics’ Deleuze (2004). We 
have illustrated this by showing how the discourse - through jumping scales from small 
every day incidents to the regional political agenda - was able to steer the creation of 
new pieces of legislation and regulation. But this is only halve of the power of the 
discourse, as afterwards - this is after the new legislation is implemented - it is also 
used to legitimise it. Politicians and policymakers can stress that, following the 
discourse, they are actually doing what the sector - considered as holding the 
knowledge regarding a certain issue - is asking. 
Secondly we want to argue that, in order to have full effect and as such to be regarded 
as a discourse the way it is defined by Foucault, Deleuze and Blommaert, it has to meet 
a certain set of criteria: 
1. There has to be some sort of fertile breeding ground.  In our case this has at 
least two dimensions. First, there is the historically marginal position of the 
social rental sector, with the consequence that no firm advocacy for them can 
be found. Today quasi nobody stand up for social rental housing. The second 
concerns real worries following from the impoverishment of the tenants, 
leading to decreasing rental incomes at a moment that more money for 
renovation and social support is needed 19; 
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2. The discourse is experienced as a coherent and very rational line of reasoning. 
With regards to solving the problems in social rental housing estates with 
concepts such as ‘social mix’ on the one hand and ‘voluntary concentration’ on 
the other, the lines of reasoning, elucidated by some of the protagonists, can 
easily be followed and understood, even if it is against one’s own opinion. 
3. The discourse is (partly) constructed and supported by leading figures, whose 
authority is widely acknowledged and widely respected. Their contemplations 
and views on the subject are considered as truthful, by the general public.  
4. There are close personal and/or institutional links between the local and the 
regional level. 
5. A counter-discourse is absent, not fully developed or is being ignored, as is 
possible research on the subject. Until today no solid third party report on the 
liveability of social rental housing exists. Neither one is under way. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Note that ‘social’ in this case refers to three different types of subsidised housing. In 
the first place it refers to ‘classic’ social rental housing. But next to that, it also refers 
to houses built by social housing companies for purchase and plots of land. In the latter 
cases the term ‘social’ refers more to the institutionalised way of allocation than to the 
target group, who are middle classes (De Decker, 2001).  
2 VVH stands for ‘Vlaamse Vereniging van Huisvestingsmaatschappijen’ or ‘Flemish 
confederation of social housing companies’. It is the trade union of the social housing 
companies. 
3 A financial vehicle found in the early 1990s to build 10,000 additional social rental 
dwellings next to the VHM. 
4 A local social housing company. 
5 VLM stands for Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, the organisation that had its roots in the 
above mentioned SNPPT, the National Society for Small Land Owning 
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6 Our inventory reveals: mayors, aldermen, MP’s, chairmen and board members of 
social housing companies, managers of social housing companies (local and regional), 
journalists, academics, ministers, employees of ministers, chairmen of political parties, 
organisations like tenant’s unions and local welfare work, etc 
7 A rough inventory of public quotes for the period 1988-2002 adds up to 174 pages 
(Tahome, 11). 
8 Please note the naming of these estates, already addressed higher. 
9 Quoted from the ‘Gazet van Antwerpen’ newspaper article by journalist K. 
Tuerlinckx on 17 March 17 1997. 
10 Cools would later become chairman of the local social service of the city of 
Antwerp, and after his retirement, finished a PhD on working with different lifestyle in 
social housing (Cools, 2004). 
11 With a 2 paged follow up in the journal De Morgen (11 June 1990) with a reaction 
of the chairman of the socialist party, stating that he is pro social mix. 
12 Referring to earlier remarks in this paper we like to (re)stress that social housing was 
already opened up to more ‘middle class’ people, but one needs to be aware that this 
category becomes (or tries to become) a home-owner as soon as possible. 
13 Fax: internal document that was widely covered by the media (journals, radio and 
television, 26 March 1998). Also because it provoked a young and at that time 
promising Moroccan female politician, working for a Christian Democratic Minister 
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(Lanjri, 1998). The topic got already dealt with before and later the thesis would be 
repeated. 
14 It is not clear who said what (Gazet Van Antwerpen, 28 January 2002). One of the 
authors, being there, only heard the speech of Voorhamme. 
15 Patrick Janssens combines the mayorship of Antwerp with a seat as MP. 
Voorhamme, who is a former MP, is an alderman in Antwerp since 2003. Both 
had/have functions in social housing companies.   
16 Document dated 29 September 1997. 
17 ‘Different life styles cause resistance, rejection, resentment and prejudices. A well-
balanced mix of different life styles give opportunities for living together’. 
18 This is actually a separate discourse, because it has already been illustrated by 
several authors that there is no real ‘affordability problem’ Pannecoucke et al, 2001; 
De Decker et al, 2008; Winters & De Decker, 2009).). 
19 Note that welfare and housing policies are completely separated and that no money 
is going from the welfare department to housing. 
